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WAITING TO EXHALE: MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND ITS UNCERTAIN
FUTURE
I. Introduction
Therapeutic use of marijuana is a political, medical and moral issue that has
provoked controversy throughout this century. On one side of the debate is the
governments desire to prevent drug abuse and to make certain that medical
therapies are scientically sound and do not raise false hopes. On the other
side are the interests of desperately ill patients who long for relief and desire
autonomous decision-making over their own well-being. Caught in the middle
are loved ones of the seriously ill, physicians, and the general public, who wish
to be law abiding, yet who remain convinced and confused about the medical
uses of marijuana.
Both sides have their extremes. Proponents of a drug-free America argue
that any legalization of marijuana, including loosening restrictions for medical
testing and use, should be prohibited. Groups such as the National Federation
of Parents for a Drug-Free Youth believe that marijuana is dangerous and can
be a gateway to more serious drug use.' However, medical studies show that
marijuana has few side eects, is not addictive, and is generally safer than
cigarettes, alcohol, and even aspirin.2 In addition, there is no evidence that
recreational use of marijuana leads to the use of more dangerous drugs.3
On the other hand, advocates of complete legalization of marijuana claim
that marijuana is not harmful and thus should be accessible to anyone who
wants it, not just seriously ill patients. However, nonprot institutions such as
the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws have ultimately
lost every attempt to even begin to loosen the restrictions on marijuana.4 Al-
though government-sanctioned studies have repeatedly recommended decrimi-
nalizing possession of marijuana, the government's response
12 ROBERT C. RANDALL, MARIJUANA, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW
395 (1989).
2Judy Foremen, Medical Marijuana {A Cure ora Curse?, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 25.
3LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FOR-
BIDDEN MEDICINE 147 (1993).
4See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National
Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 559 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin.
& Dept of Heath Education
& Welfare, No. 79-1660 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1980); Alliance for Cannabis Ther-
apeutics v. Drug
1Enforcement Admin, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and Alliance for Cannabis
Therapeutics v. Drug
Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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to these studies in the past has sent a clear message: any legalization of
marijuana is political suicide when our country's drug problems and crime rate
have escalated.
This paper will analyze the political and legal history of medical marijuana
and its current legal status in the United States. I will argue throughout that
the present lack of access to marijuana for medicinal purposes is unwarranted.
I will conclude with a discussion of such possible future solutions as:
(1) approval of a marijuana New Drug Application (NDA'~) by the
Food and Drug Administration ('FDA'); (2) a Congressional statute allowing
marijuana to be prescribed; and, most importantly, (3) education of the public
about the medical uses of marijuana.
II. History of Medical Marijuana
A. Pre-1937
Marijuana (Cannabis sativa) has been used as a medicine in India, China, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Africa, and South America for thousands
of years.5 In the United States, the medicinal properties of marijuana were rst
recognized in the mid-nineteenth century. 6 From 1840-1900 Western medical
literature proliferated with ndings of the therapeutic value of marijuana.7 Med-
ical reports indicate that during this time American physicians recommended
marijuana for tetanus, migraines, neuralgia, convulsions, as a sleep aid, as an
appetite stimulant, and as a general pain killer.8 Marijuana was even listed as
a recognized medicine in the United States Pharmacopoeia from 1850 through
1942.~
B. The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937
Although Marijuana was included in the Food and Drug Act in 1915,10 it was
not until Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act (MTA) of 1937 that the medic-
inal use of marijuana met its legal demise. 11 Under the MTA, anyone using
marijuana for industrial or medical purposes was required to register and pay
a tax of a dollar an ounce.'2 Even though the MTA was aimed at stopping
recreational marijuana use
5GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at 3.
61d at4.
71d. at 5.
81d at 5-7.
9JEROME HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIJUANA
22(1983).
101d. at 23.
11Marijuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. x 4741 etseq. (1964) (repealed).
I2GPJNSPCJ~)N supra note 3, at 8.
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(the MTA charged recreational users $100 per ounce),13 the enormous record-
keeping requirements for medicinal use discouraged doctors from using marijuana.14
The history of the passage of the MTA illustrates the beginning of the govern-
ment's crusade against marijuana and helps explain the current stigma attached
to its use for any purpose. Before the Act was passed, Harry J. Anslinger, then
the Commissioner of the Treasury Department's Bureau of Narcotics, (the fore-
runner of the Drug Enforcement Administration) ran a successful media cam-
paign depicting marijuana use as addictive and the cause of violence and psy-
chosis. 15 The most memorable aspect of Anslinger's campaign is the lm Reefer
Madness, which graphically portrayed the potential evils of marijuana, includ-
ing allegations that marijuana caused one man to murder his entire family.16
Thus, by using powerful imagery and symbols, Anslinger provoked mass hyste-
ria about the dangers of marijuana with little to no evidence that the drug was
harmful, yet with the support of most of the medical community. 17
Some scholars believe that Anslinger's war against marijuana was borne out
of racism and xenophobia. At the time the MTA was passed, recreational users
of marijuana included mostly Mexican immigrants and black jazz musicians.'8
Some social scientists argue that the federal government preyed upon exist-
ing anti-Mexican sentiment by implying that since Mexican-Americans and
other marginalized groups used marijuana, marijuana must produce violence
and other anti-social behavior stereotypically associated with these groups. 19
Thus, marijuana was classied as a narcotic, and not regulated as permissively
as alcohol and tobacco, which were vices native to white European-Americans.
20
131d.
141d.
151d.
'6See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 775 (E.D. Miss. 1994).
170ne of the only opponents of the MTA was Dr. W.C. Woodward, the legislative
counsel for the American Medical Association. GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at
9. Woodward argued for less restrictive regulation to study the medicinal uses
of marijuana. Id.
18HIMM~SThIN supra note 9.
19HIMMELSTEIN, supra note 9, at 29.
20Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine,
13 HAMLINE J. PUBL L. & PcL'Y 117(1992).
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C. Subsequent Reports and Studies
Despite the federal government's eorts to portray marijuana as an addictive
and dangerous drug, not everyone was convinced. In 1938, New York Mayor
Fiorello LaGuardia commissioned a medical team to study the medical, sociolog-
ical, and psychological aspects of marijuana use in New York City.21 This com-
mittee published a report in 1944, entitled The Marijuana Problem in the City
of New York (The LaGuardia Report). The LaGuardia Report contradicted
much of the propaganda surrounding the passage of the MTA by concluding
that marijuana use was not addictive, did not cause aggressive or anti-social
behavior, and did not promote criminal activity. 22
At rst, the Journal of the American Medical Association (AMA) applauded
the ndings of the LaGuardia Report, by describing it as a careful study and
by acknowledging marijuana's potential therapeutic use for treating depression,
appetite loss, and opiate addiction.23 However, one month later the AMA suc-
cumbed to pressure by Anslinger and the Bureau of Narcotics and published
an editorial denouncing the LaGuardia Report as unscientic, uncritical and
scientically dubious.24 Taking a fervent political position, the AMA went on
to state that [plublic ocials will do well to disregard this study, and continue
to regard marihuana as a menace wherever it is purveyed.25 Due to the bit-
ter attacks against it, the LaGuardia Report was discredited and subsequently
largely ignored by doctors, politicians and patients.
For a few decades, the government lost interest in investigating the eects
of marijuana. However, in 1971 President Nixon established the National Com-
mission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. This commission, known as the Shafer
Commission, named after Chairman Raymond P. Shafer, released its report en-
titled Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding on March 22, 1972.26 As is
apparent by the
21GRINSPOON supra note 3, at 11.
221d. Incidentally, today, virtually everyone who is knowledgeable about the
eects of marijuana agrees
that marijuana does not lead to violence. See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT
C. GROSS, AMERICA'S
LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS
44(1993).
23GR1NSPOCJN supra note 3, at 12.
241d
26Bilz, supra note 20; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND
DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 16(1972).
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report s title, the results of the study were unwelcome by President Nixon,
particularly at a time when marijuana use was associated with the anti-establishment,
hippie-culture of the 1960's and early 1970's.
The Shafer Commission's Report boldly attempted to demythologize the
misconceptions of marijuana brought about by previous administrations. Among
other things, the Commission found that there was no rational basis for passing
the Marijuana Tax Act of j937,27 that marijuana is not addictive or signicantly
harmful, and that it should not be classied as a narcotic.28 More importantly,
the Shafer Commission's controversial stance that personal possession of mar-
ijuana be decriminalized, overshadowed their recommendation that marijuana
be thoroughly researched for potential medical uses.29 Instead of considering the
conclusions in the report, President Nixon vowed to ignore them and to declare
a war on drugs.30
The next signicant study done regarding the health eects of marijuana
was a study commissioned by the National Institutes of Health and completed
by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in February in 1982.
Although the NAS panel stated that marijuana justies serious national con-
cern, 31 it also made promising ndings regarding the use of marijuana and
marijuana derivatives in treating glaucoma, asthma, and nausea resulting from
chemotherapy treatment.32 In addition, the NAS panel made an urgent plea for
further research regarding therapeutic uses of marijuana as well as for further
research investigating the long-term eects of the drug. 33
However, the ndings of this NAS panel were soon eclipsed by the ndings of
another NAS panel a few months later. In July of 1982, the Committee on Sub-
stance Abuse and Habitual Behavior released their study, commissioned in 1978
by the federal National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), regarding the scal
and social costs of enforcing marijuana laws.34 This NAS panel recommended
that possession of small amounts of marijuana be decriminalized because the
costs of enforcing the law outweighed the
27Bilz, supra note 20.
28NY TIMES, Feb. 13, 1972, at 1.
291d; Bilz, supra note 20.
30N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1971, at 50; Bilz, supra note 20.
31The Potshot That Backred; Science agency rejects its own study on easing
marijuana laws, TIME, Jul.
19, 1982, at 79.
32Another Sort of Smoke; Marijuana: Justies Serious National Concern,
TIME, Mar. 8, 1992, at 73.
33Matt Clark & Mary Hagar, The Hazards of Marijuana, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 8, 1982, at 89.
34The Potshot That Backred, supra note 31.
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benets.35 The attention given to this panel's legal conclusions overshad-
owed the previous panel's positive medical conclusions concerning therapeutic
use of marijuana. The panel' s recommendation of partial legalization was vehe-
mently criticized by the president of the NAS and the director of NIDA and was
completely at odds with the Reagan administration's hard-line stance against
all drugs, including marijuana.36
Ill. The Legal Status of Medical Marijuana Today
A. The Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, also known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).37 The
CSA was enacted in the face of the nation's growing drug problem and was the
federal government's rst eort at a comprehensive regulatory scheme for haz-
ardous drugs. The CSA classies a drug or substance into one of ve dierent
Schedules, depending on criteria such as safety and potential for abuse.38
Congress placed the marijuana plant in Schedule I, the category of drugs
with the most severe controls, restrictions, and penalties for use.39 In order to
be a Schedule I drug, the CSA mandates ndings by the Drug Enforcement
administration (DEA, a division of the Department of Justice under the At-
torney General) that: (1) the drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse; (2) the drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States; and (3) there is a lack of accepted safety for
use of the drug or other substance under medial supervision.40 Other Schedule
I drugs include heroin and LSD.41
Schedule II drugs are less stringently regulated but are still considered dan-
gerous. The criteria for Schedule II drugs are somewhat dierent: (1) the drug
or substance still has a high potential for abuse; (2) however, the drug or other
substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States
or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; and (3) abuse of
the drug or other substance
351d.
~~2l U.S.C. xx 801-971 (1988).
381d. at x 812.
391d; 930 F.2d at 937.
4021 U.S.C. at x 812(b)(1).
411d. at x 812.
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may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.42 Schedule II drugs
include drugs such as cocaine, morphine, amphetamines and barbiturates.43
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal active ingredient in marijuana, and
its synthetic equivalents are Schedule II drugs.44
The CSA allows a drug to be transferred between schedules either by a mo-
tion by the Attorney General (i.e. the DEA) or by a challenge to the Attorney
General's classication by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare (Now
known as the Department of Health & Human services, which includes the Food
& Drug administration (FDA)), or by any interested party.45 Re-classication
is important because Schedule I and Schedule II drugs are regulated dier-
ently. On the one hand, the DEA has discretion whether or not to accept or
deny registration by potential manufacturers and distributors of both Schedule
I and Schedule II drugs and may limit the manufacturer to a particular as-
signed quota.'~ However, Schedule I drugs are subject to much stricter research
application requirements than Schedule II drugs and Schedule I drugs are not
permitted to be prescribed by doctors.47 Thus, re-classication from Schedule I
to Schedule II is particularly signicant for medical marijuana research and use
and has been the subject of litigation for over twenty years.
B. Eorts to Reschedule Marijuana to Schedule II
The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) led a
rule-making petition on May 18, 1972, requesting that the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA) reschedule marijuana from Schedule Ito
Schedule ~~48 This lawsuit initiated a lengthy and complex legal battle that
eventually ended only last year. Much of the litigation centered around the
statutory interpretation and administrative discretion of the DEA. Specically,
the litigation focused on whether or not marijuana has the Schedule II require-
ment of a currently accepted medical use in treatment or whether there is a
currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions. The arguments made in
these
421d at x 812(b)(2).
431d. at x 812.; Bilz, supra note 20.
44Bilz, supra note 20.
~~21 U.S.C. at x 811(a).
~kL at x 823(a)-(c).
471d. at x 823(0.
48497 F.2d at 655.
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court proceedings are illustrative of the numerous diering interests sur-
rounding the issue of medical marijuana.
After initial complications involving the eect of international obligations on
re-scheduling and the need for an FDA evaluation regarding medical and sci-
entic ndings, the DEA nally held public hearings in front of Administrative
Law Judge Francis L. Young concerning whether or not the marijuana plant
should be rescheduled in 1986.~~ Advocates in favor of rescheduling included
NORML, The Alliance For Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT, the name plainti in
the proceedings), The Cannabis Corporation of America (CCA), and the Zion
Coptic Church (a religious organization which believes marijuana is sacred).
The parties opposing marijuana's rescheduling included the DEA, the Interna-
tional Chiefs of Police (ICOP) and the National Federation of Parents for Drug
Free Youth (NFP).50
I. Arguments for Rescheduling Marijuana: The Patients, the Par-
ents and the Doctors
The parties who argued that marijuana be rescheduled, submitted poignant
testimony from many patients who used marijuana to alleviate the pain they
suered from such debilitating diseases as glaucoma, cancer, multiple sclerosis,
quadriplegia and severe neuro-dermatitis.5' For example, Valerie Leigh Cover,
a twenty-eight year old woman aicted with multiple sclerosis, had become ad-
dicted to Valium and was suering from spasms and severe nausea and vomiting.
After she stopped taking Valium and began to smoke marijuana, she testied
that she no longer felt nauseous. .. noticed [hen intense spasms were signi-
cantly reduced and her appetite began to increase.52 Moreover, because most
of these patients obtained marijuana illegally, they suered constant anxiety
about the possibility of arrest and were enraged at potentially being branded
a criminal for using the only substance that provided relief from the pain of
their otherwise incurable diseases.53 In addition to this anecdotal evidence from
patients, ACT also submitted adavits from relatives, and particularly from
parents of the seriously ill, who also testied to
49~j Fed. Reg. 22946-01 (1986); 559 F.2d at 735. The issue of whether syn-
thetic reproductions of THC could be classied under Schedule I or II was settled
in the meantime. On May 31, 1985, the FDA approved a NDA for Marmnol
Capsules, containing a synthetic form of THC. Subsequently, the DEA placed
Marinol on Schedule II. 51 Fed. Reg. 17476(1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 22,946(1986).
50ROBERT C. RANDALL, M ARIJUANA,MEDICINE, AND THE LAW ix, x
(1988).
at 1-5.
521d at 231.
531d at 105.
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the apparent therapeutic eects of marijuana on their loved ones and who
made desperate pleas to make marijuana accessible. ~
ACT and their co-parties' most important evidence was the testimony by
doctors and pharmacologists regarding the accepted medical use of marijuana.
The doctors who testied on behalf of rescheduling marijuana argued that al-
though synthetic THC is available for prescription under Schedule II constraints,
smoking marijuana is actually preferable to taking a pill. These experts stated
that their patients could more easily control their dosage with a joint, that pills
are dicult to keep down for patients suering from nausea and vomiting, and
that by inhaling smoke, the eects of the drug are felt more quickly.55
From this testimony, it is apparent that the ban on medical marijuana places
constraints on the doctor-patient relationship and forces many doctors to violate
their ethical duty to practice medicine for the good of their patients. The
physicians who testied before the AU in favor of rescheduling cited not only
the safety and eectiveness of medical marijuana, but also noted their frustration
in being unable to prescribe marijuana freely.56 Feeling that their hands were
tied, these physicians were often put in an untenable position: they could either
not even mention marijuana and its possible therapeutic eects, in which case
their patients would suer, or they could suggest illegal acquisition of the drug,
in which case they would be advocating breaking the law. In either case they
did not (and still do not) even have the option of prescribing marijuana.
2. Arguments Against Rescheduling Marijuana: The Government,
the Parents and the Doctors
The DEA testimony consisted overwhelmingly of arguments from physi-
cians and pharmacologists who felt that there simply were not enough prop-
erly controlled scientic and medical studies to show that the marijuana plant
has an accepted medical use in the United States for treating such diseases
as glaucoma, multiple sclerosis and nausea and resulting from chemotherapy.57
Chemists noted that there are over 400 dierent chemicals and 60 cannabinoids
identied in the marijuana plant, many of
541d. at 1-5.
551d. at 83, 140.
at 147, 163.
571d. at 359, 365, 385.
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which have not been tested for safety and all of which appear in varying
degrees in each plant.58 In addition, the DEA argued that smoking marijuana
may have unwanted side-eects such as increased heart rate and adverse eects
on the lungs, and maintained that synthetic oral THC is equally, if not more
eective.59
It is important to note that the DEA did not argue that the use of marijuana
for medical purposes is necessarily ineective, but only that there is insucient
data for an accepted medical use.60 However, it is dicult to ascertain how much
of the testimony by the scientic community against rescheduling marijuana was
prompted by an unconscious reaction to the substances' stigma as a Schedule I
illegal drug. Many well-established doctors were not willing to face the political
repercussions associated with calling marijuana safe for use as a medicine.
The DEAs position during the hearings eectively prohibited marijuana from
ever being rescheduled in the near future: the marijuana plant has not been
subjected to rigorous enough testing to be a Schedule II drug, yet its status as a
Schedule I drug makes it very dicult to research both because of the logistical
constraints and because of the reproach doctors might face for investigating the
drug. If the DEA had implicit political or social policy reasons for keeping a
lock on marijuana as a Schedule I substance (such as the fact that marijuana
is associated throughout history with dissident groups or that any legalization
is politically impossible when engaged in a war on drugs) they were careful to
never articulate them on the record in the hearings.
The arguments made by the National Federation of Parents for a Drug Free
Youth were probably more honest than those made by the DEA. Instead of
focusing exclusively on the scientic uncertainty of medical marijuana, the NEP
argued that rescheduling marijuana sends the wrong message to a nation that
is engaged in a battle for its very survival because of epidemic drug abuse.6' In
addition, the NEP believed that young people would interpret rescheduling as
a sign that marijuana is OK and that [wie then
581d. at 314: In addition, testimony of one of DEA's scientists reveals that
some natural occurring plants such as Digitalis, have been used for centuries as
drugs within our cultural milieu. Id. at 327-28.
Arguably, marijuana was also part of our cultural milieu before it was eectively
banned by the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937.
~Id at 314; 2 RANDALL, supra note I, at 267, 286. 602 RANDALL, supra
note 1, at 281.
611d at 395.
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have another youngster trying marijuana, the gateway drug and probably
starting down the road that leads to nowhere but destruction. 62 Although this
stepping stone argument has been popular rhetoric for denouncing marijuana,
no study has ever substantiated this theory.63
In any case, both of NFP's arguments, that rescheduling sends the wrong
message and that marijuana is a gateway drug, are erroneous in the discussion
about making marijuana available for desperately ill patients. Allowing medical
marijuana only sends the wrong message if the public remains uneducated about
the therapeutic eects of the drug on patients with severe disabilities. Until the
debate about medical marijuana is suciently distinguished between the debate
about total legalization of marijuana, the arguments of the NEP will continue
to be persuasive to politicians and the public.
3. The Outcome of the Litigation
Judge Young issued his decision on September 6, 1988. Creating somewhat
of a public fervor,
Judge Young concluded that the provisions of the CSA required the transfer
of marijuana from Schedule I
to Schedule H.64 Judge Young dismissed the notion that rescheduling will
'send a signal' that marijuana is
'OK' for recreational use,65 holding that this fear is specious and should not
be allowed to override the
legitimate need of countless suerers who can be provided with relief when
marijuana is prescribed by a
physician in a legitimate case. 66
However, John Law, then the Administrator of the DEA, vehemently over-
ruled the AU decision, rejecting the medical and testimonial evidence that mar-
ijuana has an accepted medical use.67 The Administrator chastised the irre-
sponsible and irrational statements propounded by the pro-marijuana parties
and called Judge Young's nding appalling.68 In addition, the Administrator
argued that the testimony advocating rescheduling may be rejected as quackery
and that ACT and NORML have falsely
621d.; This argument is also known as the stepping stone hypothesis, and
was probably rst introduced
by the Anslinger campaign for the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in the
1930's. HIMMELSTEIN, supra
note 9, at 86.
63GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at 445.
M2 RANDALL, supra note 1, at 445.
65J4
~Id
6754 Fed. Reg. 53767, 53770 (1989).
681d at 53783.
1211
13691d. at 53784.
701d.
~'930 F.2d at 937. 721d at 939.
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raised the expectations of many seriously ill persons by claiming that mari-
juana has medical usefulness in treating emesis, glaucoma, spasticity and other
illnesses.69
Two elements of the Administrator's decision are particularly striking. First,
throughout the Administrator's opinion, he continuously referred to ACT, NORML
and the CCA as the pro-marijuana parties, an eective rhetorical technique mis-
branding these parties as having advocated complete and utter legalization of
marijuana throughout the hearings. In addition, this was the st time the gov-
ernment raised the false hopes argument, whereby the Administrator argued
that ACT and NORML had perpetrated a dangerous and cruel hoax on the
American public by advocating medical use of marijuana.70 This allegation is
misplaced in a legal proceeding for the rescheduling of a substance. ACT and
NORML were exercising their legal right under the CSA to petition for the
rescheduling of a drug. These parties were not marketing marijuana to the
American public. This kind of false hopes argument is best left for use by the
FDA in situations where manufacturers mislead the public as to the therapeutic
eects of a drug under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and is irrelevant in a
proceeding under the CSA.
ACT and NORML petitioned for review of the Administrator's decision. In
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Administration, the
D.C. Circuit agreed with petitioners that the DEA Administrator may have
relied on several factors in the determination of whether or not marijuana has
an accepted medical use which were impossible to satisfy because of the drug's
restrictive Schedule I status.71 In his opinion, the Administrator used an eight-
factor test for determining the currently accepted medical use of marijuana.
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the Administrator for an explanation
of how a Schedule I illegal drug could ever satisfy the factors requiring general
availability of the substance and its use, recognition of its use in generally ac-
cepted pharmacopoeia, medical references, etc. and recognition and use... by a
substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the U.S.72
In March of 1992, Robert C. Bonner, then the Administrator of the DEA,
issued another order condensing the initial eight-factor test into a ve-factor
test for determining when a drug has a currently
12
144.
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accepted medical use and holding that marijuana did not satisfy the ve-
factor test.73 In February of
1994, the D.C. Circuit reviewed this subsequent order and held that the new
test was not impossible for a
Schedule I drug to meet and that the Administrator's decision not to resched-
ule marijuana was reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence on the record. ~
C. FDA Compassionate Use INDs
In the midst of the rescheduling petition and the ensuing litigation, the FDA
began receiving applications from patients who wished to use medical marijuana
under a Compassionate Use Investigational New Drug (IND) program. The
program was cumbersome and time consuming:
physicians had to le special forms with the DEA and the application then
had to be approved by the DEA and the FDA.75 If the form was approved,
the doctor then had to ll out special order forms and send them to National
Institute on Drug Abuse.76 In addition, doctors were reluctant to have them-
selves stigmatized as marijuana advocates and some felt that their government
research grants would be jeopardized if they led for Compassionate Use INDs
for their patients. 77
For about fteen years, the marijuana was grown at a NIDA research farm in
Oxford, Mississippi, but even at its peak only fteen people received marijuana
under the program.78 The FDA received hundreds of applications from the in-
ception of the program and they were deluged with thousands of applications
from people with AIDS beginning in 1989.~~ AIDS suerers cited marijuana as
welcome relief from the nausea brought on by AZT and claimed that marijuana
was an eective drug in helping AIDS-related anorexia.80
Although the onslaught of applications from AIDS patients desiring medical
marijuana added a new vocal advocate for the therapeutic uses of marijuana,
the Department of Health and Human Services
7357 Fed. Reg. 10499, 10507 (1992).
7415F.3dat 1136.
75GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at 20-21.
77DUKE & GROSS, supra note 22, at 183.
78Michael Isiko, Compassionate Marijuana Use Supplies for Medical Needs
are in Jeopardy, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at z19.
79GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at 21.
80BiIz, supra note 20; Mike McKee, Caught in the Drug War Cross Fire, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 30, 1992,
at 1.
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decided to phase out the Compassionate Use IIND program in 1991.81 The
revocation of the programjust at a point when thousands of AIDS patients had
applied did not strike some as a coincidence, but more as a continuation of the
Reagan-Bush anti-AIDS stance. Comments from James 0. Mason, director of
the Public Health Service seem to support this view, for Mason said he thought
allowing AIDS patients to smoke marijuana may interfere with their ability to
use a condom and generally practice safe sex.82
However, HHS ocials cited political reasons for ending the IND program,
stating that it gives a bad signal and arguing that it undercut ocial Bush ad-
ministration policy against the use of illegal drugs.83 In addition, government
ocials claimed that marijuana posed the same health risks as those cited by
the DEA in the rescheduling litigation.~ The policy change to halt the Com-
passionate Use INDs was actually an inter-agency decision made by the DEA,
the Public Health Service and the National Institute of Health.85 The FDA had
approved at least twenty seven seriously ill patients for the program when it
was canceled.86 None of these individuals were ever provided marijuana under
the program despite having their applications accepted; thus, if anyone raised
the false hopes of the desperately ill it was the government.
D. Federal Legislation
An attempt at passing legislation mandating that medical marijuana be avail-
able failed. In 1985, Representative Stewart McKinney (Conn.) introduced a
bill entitled Legislation to End Prohibition of Medical Use of Marijuana for Se-
riously I Americans.87 It is not surprising that the bill was unsuccessful, for
before it was even introduced the Reagan administration had already rejected
the ndings of two NAS panels regarding the potential therapeutic uses and
legalization of marijuana.88 Eorts to pass a bill legalizing the therapeutic use
of heroin have also been futile.89
8tMichael Isiko, HHS to Phase Out Marijuana Program, WASH. POST.,
June 22, 1991, at a14.
82lsiko, supra note 78.
83Id
84Dianne Klein, The Empty Pot: U.S. Draws Criticism for Decision to Halt
Little-Known Program to Distribute Free Marijuana to the Seriously Ill, LOS
ANG. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1992, at A3.
87131 CONG. REC. H2678-05 (1985).
885ee supra notes 3 1-36 and accompanying text.
89135 CONG. REC. S289-01 (1989).
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E. State Legislation
State governments responded more favorably to the need for therapeutic mari-
juana, yet they faced serious implementation problems caused by preemption by
federal laws. At one point, at least thirty-ve states passed legislation approv-
ing the medical use of marijuana for certain patientsY~ These statutes provided
medical marijuana in the guise of creating state therapeutic research programs,
which typically required doctors to certify to the state that their patients were
seriously ill and unresponsive to conventional medical treatment.91
However, because of marijuana's status as a Schedule I drug under the CSA,
these states were dependent on dispensing marijuana through the federal gov-
ernment and had to get FDA approval for their IND programs.92 As a result,
the bureaucratic procedure and lengthy delays forced most states to abandon
their eorts at providing medical marijuana. Some states have even repealed
their legislation and some statutes have expired.93 Recent action by California
Governor Pete Wilson suggests that the states are taking a more conservative
approach. Despite the passage of a San Francisco referendum in 1991 urging
California to permit doctors to prescribe marijuana for seriously ill patients,94
Wilson recently vetoed legislation that would have allowed physicians to pre-
scribe marijuana, citing conicts with federal law and policy.95
F. The Medical Necessity Defense
Some state and federal courts have allowed an individual charged with possession
of marijuana to claim a medical necessity defense.96 Robert Randall, the founder
of ACT and a glaucoma suerer, was
~ GRINSPOON, supra note 3, at 17. The states which enacted such
legislation include: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
915ee MICH. STAT. ANN. xx 333.7335-36(1984) (expired 1982).
92GRINSP~~N, supra note 3, at 17.
93MICH. REV. STAT. ANN. xx 333.7335-36(1984) (expired 1982); CAL. HEALTh
& SAFETY CODE xx
11260-11270(1985), repealed by Stats. 1984, ch. 417, x 5, e. July 11, 1984,
operative June 30, 1989;
17ALASKA STAT. x 17, ch. 35(1984), repealed by ALASKA STAT. x 22, ch.
146(1986); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. x 40:1021-: 1026 (1985), repealed by Acts 1989, No. 662, x 8, e. July 7,
1989; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, xx 2401-2420 (1984), repealed by x 2410, e. Sept. 14, 1981.
94lsiko, supra note 78.
95Wilson vetoes marijuana, AIDS bills, CANCER RESEARCHER WEEKLY,
Oct. 17, 1994, at 12.
96United States v. Burgon, 894 F.2d 188 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 157
(1990); Jenks v. State, 582
So.2d 676(1991); State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (1979); State v. Diana, 604
P.2d 1312 (1979).
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the rst person to successfully assert the defense in the D.C. Superior Court
in 1976.~~ In 1992, the Maine legislature passed a law establishing an arma-
tive defense for marijuana users who were diagnosed with glaucoma and who
suered side eects from radiation treatment.98 However, Maine Governor John
McKearnan vetoed the legislation under pressure from the federal government.
The medical necessity defense, while potentially useful in some situations,
is not accessible to everyone who uses marijuana for medicinal purposes and is
unattractive because of its availability only after a seriously ill patient has been
arrested. The courts which have allowed a medical necessity defense typically
require expert medical testimony that the harm from the defendant's disease is
serious and imminent and that conventional medical alternatives are ineective
or unavailable. 100 This puts a dicult burden of proof on a defendant and is
costly. In addition, some states, like Minnesota and New Jersey, have rejected
the medical necessity defense altogether. 101
W. The Future Of The Therapeutic Use Of Marijuana
Medical marijuana will never be available for prescription on a national
level until it is transferred to Schedule II of the CSA. The courts in the ACT
rescheduling litigation eectively foreclosed any opportunity by citizen groups to
petition for rescheduling in the near future by arming the DEA's position that
more rigorous and scientically accepted research must be done on marijuana
before it can be considered to have a currently accepted medical use. Anecdotal
evidence from suerers of glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and AIDS, and
adavits from their physicians are insucient. Even a 1991 study done by
Richard Doblin and Mark Klcinman of Harvard's Kennedy School revealing
that forty-eight percent of the oncologists surveyed said they would prescribe
marijuana for some of their patients if it were legal is not enough to prove that
marijuana is accepted by the medical community.102
97United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash.L.Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super.
1976).
98McKee, supra note 80.
~Id.
1001d.; 595 P.2d at 287.
101 State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941 (1986); State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d
77(1991).
102 Brian Hecht, Out of Joint: The Case for Medicinal Marijuana, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jul. 15, 1991, at 7.
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A. Proving Accepted Medical Use of Marijuana and the Role of the
FDA in Rescheduling
Since it is unlikely that the DEA will change its tough war on drugs stance
and recommend rescheduling itself, one possible way to demonstrate marijuana's
accepted therapeutic use is through endorsement by the FDA. The CSA provides
that the FDA may recommend that a substance not be controlled.103 The FDA's
scientic and medical ndings are binding on the DEA and the DEA may not
control a substance if the FDA recommends against it.104
However, while it is not legally necessary for a drug to go through the NDA
process in order for it to be rescheduled,'05 typically the FDA only recommends
to the DEA that a drug be rescheduled after it has approved a NDA for the
drug. For example, the FDA did not recommend rescheduling THC and its syn-
thetic equivalent dronabinol (Marmnol capsules) to Schedule II until a NDA was
approved for both substances.'~ Other drugs, such as levo-alphacetylmethadol
(LAAM) have also been transferred to Schedule H upon approval of a NDA.107
Thus, the rescheduling of marijuana by the FDA hinges on whether or not the
drug could pass the rigorous requirements imposed by the IND/NDA process.
Marijuana will most likely never be approved by the FDA under a NDA.
First, the bureaucratic diculties in researching a Schedule I drug are burdensome.108
In addition, researching marijuana presents special problems because it is a
plant. Pharmaceutical companies are uninterested in investing in marijuana
because it can not be patented and because it contains many chemicals, instead
of one chemical that can be isolated and reproduced synthetically.1 ~In addition,
because the IND/NDA process is incredibly costly, the drug companies will only
sponsor a NDA if there is reasonably certainty that the application will be ap-
proved { a guarantee that can not be made in light of the political implications
surrounding marijuana.
Even if a sponsor could be found, the appropriate controlled studies may
be dicult to administer. The FDA usually requires placebo-controlled studies,
which some doctors are unwilling to do on patients 10321 U.S.C. at x811(a).
105Grinspoon v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 828 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.
1987).
10647 Fed. Reg. 10080(1982); 51 Fed. Reg. 17476 (1986).
10758 Fed. Reg. 25790 (1993).
supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
109GPJNSPOON, supra note 3, at 157.
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who are seriously ill. Donald Abrams, chairman of San Francisco's Com-
munity Consortium, has attempted to devise a trial comparing the ecacy of
inhaled marijuana to synthetic THC on AIDS patients.0 Frustrated by FDA
requirements regarding controlled studies, Abrams stated [platients with HJV
wasting syndrome should not be given an inert substance for 12 weeks.' II
Thus, the near impossibility of performing the appropriate scientic studies on
marijuana collapses into larger criticisms of the lengthy and costly IND/NDA
process and its discriminatory aect on the desperately ill.
B. Congressional Action
Another way to reschedule marijuana is to amend the CSA through Congres-
sional action. However, the possibility of passing a medical marijuana act re-
mains uncertain in today's changing political climate. Although the Clinton ad-
ministration appeared receptive to re-instituting the FDA Compassionate Use
IND program, the Public Health Service decided against lifting the ban last
August.112 Former Surgeon General Jocelyn Elders supported using marijuana
to treat certain illness; however, her dismissal may indicate that the public and
the administration is not receptive to such views. In addition, the success of
the Republicans in last fall's elections is attributed, in part, to a national desire
for politicians to get tough on crime and drugs. Indeed, the House Republicans'
Contract With America calls for wiping out crime prevention spending in the
Crime Bill and building more prisons instead. Even NORML has responded
to the changing of the guard in Washington, by shedding its hippie image and
installing a new board in order to cater to the button-down world of blue-ribbon
science and lab research, coupled with a strong aroma of libertarianism.1 13
However, there are recent indications that the public is more tolerant re-
garding recreational use of marijuana, perhaps alleviating political pressure to
brand the drug as unsafe and paving the way for public acceptance of medical
marijuana. For example, in 1987, the admission by Supreme Court nominee
110 Rebecca Voelker, Medical Marijuana: A Trial of Science and Politics.
271 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1645 (1994).
lIlj~
12Cynthia Hubert McClatchy, Membership In This Club is Criminal; Under-
ground Meeting Place Provides Marijuana to Chronically Ill, FRESNO BEE,
Sept. 4, 1994, at B 10.
3 Edward Epstein, The Marijuana Lobby Buttons Down After 2S Years of
Grass-Roots Struggles, The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana
Laws Sheds Its Long-Hair Image to Get Some Respect in Washington, SAN
FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1995, at 6/71.
18
21Student ID# 304 0376 20 57
Food & Drug Law Final
Prof. Hutt
Douglas H. Ginsburg that he had smoked marijuana while a professor at
Harvard Law School was politically devastating.114 However, today we not only
elected a President who has smoked marijuana, but also a Vice President and a
Speaker of the House who have experimented with the drug (Gingrich admitted
to smoking marijuana while in graduate school).115
The government may also be more sympathetic to the idea of medical mari-
juana than one might expect. In 1982, in a letter to the Journal of the American
Medical Association, Gingrich himself challenged the AMA to rethink its o-
cial stance against medical marijuana in the hopes that the AMA might well
discover that its own assessment of marijuana's therapeutic value has, in the
past, been more than slightly shaded by federal policies that are less than neu-
tral. 116 In addition, proponents of medical marijuana may nd that the new
anti-regulation, libertarian Republican Congress will lend an ear to the argu-
ment that seriously ill patients should be able to medicate themselves without
governmental intrusion. There are signs that even the DEA has softened its ap-
proach, for a Cannabis Buyers Club in San Francisco, which has been illegally
selling marijuana to people who suer from severe aictions, has been ignored
by the DEA for at least eight months.117 One DEA agent admitted that mari-
juana was a low priority when the agency is overwhelmed with cases involving
more dangerous drugs, such as heroin and crack.118 While these examples do
note ensure the passage of an act rescheduling marijuana, they do suggest that
the political tide may be turning towards acceptance of marijuana as medicine.
C. Re-education of the Public
Before any Congressional action can take place and before marijuana can be
approved through a NDA, a re-education of the public on a national level about
the medical uses of marijuana must occur. This education will serve to divorce
marijuana from the political symbolism and rhetoric that has surrounded the
recreational use of marijuana for the last century and will help focus the debate
on the
114 Michael Spector & James R. Dickenson, Politicians Line Up to Admit
or Deny Past Marijuana Use, WASH.POST., Nov. 8,1987, at Al.
'15 Jim Abrams, Gingrich Fires at Clinton -. He Alleges White House Sta
Used Drugs, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 5, 1994, at SA.
116Newt Gingrich, Letter to the Editor: Legal Status of Marijuana, 247 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1525, 1563
(1982). Gingrich's allegations that a quarter of the White House sta uses
drugs and are part of the
counterculture may prove that Gingrich has changed his mind regarding medical
marijuana. Abrams,
supra note 115.
117McClatchy, supra note 112.
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medical use of the drug. Many agencies and governmental institutions could
be involved in this eort as well as some non-prot organizations, succ as those
that focus on AIDS and cancer. Traditional media, such as newspapers, maga-
zines and television, could be used.
This re-education about the therapeutic uses of marijuana should seek to
dispel the myth that rescheduling marijuana will lead to the demise of Amer-
ican society by Reefer Madness. One way to do this is to focus on the fact
that marijuana would only be available by prescription, just like many other
dangerous drugs, and would still be subject to strict regulation. The Ameri-
can public must be informed that so called harder drugs, such as cocaine, are
actually Schedule II drugs which may be prescribed for medical use (some eye
surgeons do prescribe cocaine).'19 Likewise, morphine and its synthetic substi-
tute methadone, both highly addictive drugs, are classied under Schedule H
are used by physicians for pain management and to treat heroin addiction. 120
In addition, people must become aware of the relatively insignicant risk
to seriously ill patients who wish to smoke marijuana for medical purposes.
Patients suering from AIDS, terminal cancer and other severe illnesses are
in constant pain. What is the risk of smoking marijuana to someone who is
already facing the certainty of death? Moreover, of the thousands of years that
marijuana has been used, no one has ever been known to have died from the
drug. In comparison, in 1990, aspirin was cited as at least one of the possible
causes of 111 drug deaths in America. 121 Medical examiners labeled aspirin
as the sole cause of death for 18 of those people. 122
V. Conclusion
In short, the success of making marijuana a Schedule H substance and thus
increasing its therapeutic use as well as making research easier to perform, de-
pends primarily on increasing education. The strange legal history of medical
marijuana in this country is inextricably linked with politics. Doctors, govern-
ment ocials, parents, and ordinary citizens will only be persuaded that mar-
ijuana has medicinal value when the issue of medical marijuana is considered
completely separately from its recreational use in
119Klein, supra note 84.
'20D1JKE & GROSS, supra note 22, at 55, 293.
at 182.
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an some sort of an open forum. Thus, medical marijuana will only become
a reality for the gravely ill when the American public decides it is time.
21
25